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The literature on political communication is a redoubt of modernist thought. Histories of 
political communication are in part histories of technological progress. Accounts, which are too 
numerous to list comprehensively here, rehearse a well-worn story in which newspapers are 
joined by radio, limited-channel television, multiple-channel television, the Internet and social 
media in turn (Dinkin 1989; Epstein 2018). Numerous authors have organized these successive 
innovations into ‘ages’ or ‘orders’ of political communication (Blumler and Kavanagh 1999; 
Epstein 2018). These modernist ideas bleed into the study of election campaigns. A series of 
accounts using parallel categories construct three ideal-types of election campaign (Norris 2000). 
These campaign types capture, among other things, changes in the methods by which messages 
are conveyed. ‘Old’ face-to-face methods of communication in ‘premodern’ campaigns are 
supplemented and sometimes replaced by a succession of ‘new’ methods in ‘modern’ and 
‘postmodern’ campaigns. 
 
These theories embrace a form of developmental linearity. They conceive of a single path of 
campaign ‘evolution’ (Norris 2000). While campaigns may progress or regress, campaign change 
Dan Paget  Pre-proof version 
2 
 
is collapsed onto a single dimension, whether by the name of modernization or 
professionalization. It is this linearity that gives typologies of election campaigns their modernist 
character. It is also essential to these theories’ parochialism. Media systems have been studied 
extensively beyond the Western world. However, typologies in the narrower domain of election 
campaigns remain remarkably Western-centric in both their source material and domains of 
application, albeit with notable exceptions (Plasser and Plasser 2002). In this article, I do not 
challenge the conventional causal accounts of campaign change. However, I complicate these 
typologies. I contend that their conceptual linearity obscures variation in another aspect of 
electioneering: ground campaigns. In these typologies, ground campaigns feature only by virtue 
of their centrality in premodern campaigns and their peripherality in modern and postmodern 
campaigns. However, ground campaigns vary. In some, politicians reach few citizens directly at 
rallies. Instead, the rally is primarily a device to win media coverage. It is used almost exclusively 
by party leaders, if it is used at all. By contrast, in other ground campaigns, the rally is a medium 
through which junior and senior politicians alike interact directly with large portions of their 
constituents. For example, on the eve of Turkey’s 2018 election, an estimated million people 
attended one rally (Shaheen 2018). In India’s 2019 campaign, an estimated half million people 
attended another (Al Jazeera 2019). Rallies are important features of some Latin American 
campaigns (de la Torre and Conaghan 2009; Szwarcberg 2012). Data that I present below reveals 
that aggregate rally attendance is high in many Asian countries, and higher still in many African 
countries. 
 
However, existing typologies of election campaigns cannot satisfactorily express this variation in 
ground campaigns. I revise Norris’ typology to address that shortcoming. This adapted typology 
creates the conceptual space to incorporate a distinct ideal-type: the rally-intensive campaign. 
This proposed revision moves the center of gravity of the schema from the Global North 
towards the Global South. It equips the typology to capture important aspects of campaigns in 
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parts of sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and Asia. It gives expression to differences between 
these campaigns and their Western counterparts. Equally, it makes important distinctions within 
the population of ‘premodern’ election campaigns. Therefore, it speaks to the debate about 
electioneering in the Western world, and widely-accepted accounts of the main features of 
historic campaign evolution. 
 
While the prominence of the rally is intercontinental, it is most pronounced in parts of sub-
Saharan Africa. In spite of this, the means through which political messages are conveyed are 
little studied in the Africanist literature. Some of the last major works to study the structure of 
face-to-face communication in sub-Saharan Africa were written before the third wave of 
democratization and the revival of multiparty campaigns (Ellis 1989; Haugerud 1995). While 
their insights remain pertinent, they deserve updating. A rich body of work has developed which 
examines electioneering in multiparty sub-Saharan Africa. However, the great majority of these 
studies focus on parties’ messages or appeals. The means and media by which parties convey 
those messages in the campaign are little-studied. This is my point of departure from the 
Africanist literature. I seek to restore the character and structure of campaign communication in 
general and ground campaign communication in particular to the study of African electioneering. 
I argue that in many African campaigns, the rally is the primary medium of direct campaign 
communication. This structural aspect of campaign ecology underpins a variety of other features 
of the ground campaign. Equally, the prominence of the rally is a source of substantial variation 
between African campaigns; while some are rally-intensive, others are not.  
 
Typologies should make distinctions which turn on fundamental characteristics alone. I argue 
that aggregate rally-intensiveness is associated with four typical features. I demonstrate this 
through a detailed study of an extreme case (Flyvbjerg 2006): Tanzania. If the survey data is 
correct, Tanzania has the most rally-intensive campaigns in Africa, and to the best of my 
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knowledge, the world. I distil the four features of the rally-intensive campaign by observing the 
stark form that they take in the Tanzanian case. First, drawing on my ethnographic research, I 
show that not only national leaders dedicate substantial effort to convening rallies. Mid- and low-
level candidates do too. Therefore, during each day of the campaign, thousands of rallies are 
convened, both locally and nationally. Second, using original survey data, I show that local rallies 
are better attended in aggregate than national ones. Consequently, in rally-intensive campaigns, a 
large proportion of campaign contact is not only direct but intimate. Third, I show that in rally-
intensive campaigns the mass meeting dwarfs the canvass as a form of campaign contact. Fourth, 
I illustrate that Tanzanian parties’ ground campaign efforts are concentrated not on canvassing, 
but on a bundle of activities which I term the ‘production’ of rallies. Thereby, this paper deals in 
what John Gerring ironically describes as ‘mere description’ (Gerring 2012). It takes the 
categorization and characterization of campaigns as an academic end in itself. 
 
I proceed in this article by introducing the comparative typologies of election campaigns. In the 
second section, I juxtapose these works to the literature on election campaigning in sub-Saharan 
Africa to throw into relief the relative silence of the latter on ground campaign contact. In the 
third section, I present my departure from both of these literatures. I argue that aggregate rally 
attendance varies. It varies between the Global South and the contemporary Western world, 
within sub-Saharan Africa, and within the population of historic ‘premodern’ campaigns in 
Western countries. I argue that existing campaign typologies obscure, rather than order, this 
variation. I advance a typology of campaign ecologies adopted from Norris’ own which 
incorporates the rally-intensive campaign as a distinct ideal-type. In the fourth section, I 
enumerate typical features of the rally-intensive campaign by presenting evidence from my 
research in Tanzania. 
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Typologies of election campaigns 
 
Pippa Norris advances a typology of premodern, modern, and postmodern campaigns (Norris 
2000). Rachel Gibson and Andrea Römmele distinguish between premodern, modern and 
professional campaigns in almost identical terms (Gibson and Rommele 2001). Similarly, David 
Farrell and Paul Webb have advanced three ‘stages’ of election campaign professionalization 
(Farrell and Webb 2000). In parallel, Jay Blumler and Dennis Kavanagh identify three ‘ages of 
political communication’ (Blumler and Kavanagh 1999) and Ben Epstein enumerates four 
‘political communication orders’ (Epstein 2018). Typologies of political communication have 
broader scopes than typologies of election campaigns. Nonetheless, these typologies agree in 
numerous respects. Each, save Epstein’s, enumerates three categories.i Each takes the 
proliferation of limited channel television as the dividing line, or part of the dividing line, 
between the first and second categories. Equally, each takes the multiplication of television 
channels, the diffusion of the Internet, and related developments as the dividing line, or part of 
the dividing line, between the second and third categories.ii They identify similar sets of features 
as characteristic of each category too. Norris takes the media and means of communication, 
party campaign activity, political party organization and the behavior of the electorate as the 
distinctive characteristics of each type of campaign. Gibson and Römmele use terms that are 
commensurable with, though not identical to, Norris’. Farrell and Webb differ from Norris’ only 
by excluding behavior of the electorate from their list of typical features and including the 
character of parties’ messages. Blumler and Kavanagh differ from Norris by including the 
content of politicians’ messages and excluding party organization. 
 
Disagreements remain about whether the differences between the contents of each category are 
best summarized as degrees of modernization or professionalization. However, a close reading 
reveals that these five sets of authors employ the languages of both modernization and 
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professionalization as they describe their categories. Therefore, there is much that these 
typologies share. I introduce this literature by summarizing Norris’ typology of campaigns, both 
because her typology is most pertinent to the discussion that follows, and for simplicity’s sake. 
 
The typology that Norris offers is descriptive rather than causal. It concerns what each type of 
campaign is, rather than why it comes into being. Norris also advances parallel claims about the 
‘evolutionary processes of modernization [emphasis in original]’ that drive transition from one 
campaign type to another (Norris 2000:137). However, these causal claims are distinct from her 
definitions of those campaign types themselves. In Norris’ premodern campaign, the newspaper 
is the dominant mass medium. Other mass media either have limited penetration or are absent 
altogether. Accordingly, party-voter contact is direct, rather than indirect, and electioneering is 
‘local-active’. The premodern campaign is accompanied by ‘constituency-oriented’ party 
organization typified by cadre and mass parties. It also corresponds to particular forms of voter 
behavior; citizens form partisan social blocs with steadfast loyalties and selective media diets. 
 
In modern campaigns, ‘direct forms of personal communication… became supplemented by 
television. The main effort of party campaign organizations… focused on achieving favorable 
coverage on the mainstream evening news’ (Norris 2000:145). This change in party campaign 
ecology corresponds to changes in party organization. Parties adapt to privilege the iconic role of 
the leader. The strategic role of both party leadership and professional consultants increases 
(Norris 2000:145-6). Lastly, modern campaigns are typified by different electorates which are less 
partisan and more passive. These voters enjoy more neutral, homogenous media diets dominated 
by limited-channel television. In postmodern campaigns, media environments fragment. 
Channels and media proliferate, and audiences narrow. Increasing choice in media is connected 
to increasingly diverse electorates. Postmodern campaigns involve efforts by political parties to 
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design messages that are more local, interactive, and responsive to these narrower segments of 
the electorate. 
 
Not only do the typologies advanced by these authors have much in common. Their categories 
remain largely undisputed. A burgeoning field has updated and complicated many of the 
characterizations of postmodern campaigns advanced by Norris and others (Chadwick 2013; 
Gibson, Römmele, and Ward 2004; Vaccari 2013). Many stress the contingent relationship 
between technology and campaign methods (Epstein 2018; Karlsen 2010; Vaccari 2013). 
Nonetheless, most of these authors locate their studies in what they describe variously as the 
third age, Internet politics, digital politics, electronic democracy or hybrid media systems 
(Chadwick 2013; Gibson, Römmele, and Ward 2004; Vaccari 2013). Further still, this 
periodization of historic campaigning has gone largely unchallenged by recent analytic histories 
of election campaign innovation (Epstein 2018; Strömbäck 2008). 
 
Perhaps the greatest departure from these typologies is by Fritz and Gunda Plasser (Plasser and 
Plasser 2002). They contend that parties select ‘special aspects of media- and consultant-driven 
campaign practices’ and combine them with ‘country- and culture-specific traditional campaign 
styles’ (Plasser & Plasser, 2002:348). This leads to hybrid campaigns, not unlike those described 
by Carlos de la Torre and Catherine Conaghan (de la Torre and Conaghan 2009). Plasser and 
Plasser identify five campaign styles which arise from this hybridity: American, West European, 
Central and Eastern European, and East Asian styles, and a final style which they identify in 
South African and Indian campaigns. 
 
 
Election campaigning in sub-Saharan Africa 
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While the literature that I have described above is sometimes characterized as comparative, in 
fact, it is dominated by studies of economically advanced countries in the Western world. 
Indeed, many of the studies which I have described above, including Norris’, explicitly limit their 
domains of application to the West or some equivalent category such as ‘post-industrial 
societies’. In this article, I consider how to characterize and classify sub-Saharan African election 
campaigns in particular, and others like them. 
 
Studies of African election campaigns in the 1950s and 1960s emphasized the paramount 
importance of rallies (Mackenzie and Robinson 1960). However, subsequent studies examined 
the centrality of face-to-face communication in the context of postcolonial authoritarianism. 
Stephen Ellis argues that when mass media are censored and government controlled, news is 
‘broadcast’ over ‘pavement radio’, or by word of mouth (Ellis 1989). In this context, 
interpersonal communication carries rumor and is potentially subversive. Angelique Haugerud 
emphasizes the importance of the baraza or government-convened public meetings (Haugerud 
1995). At these meetings, social hierarchies are displayed, and thus, are reproduced. Explicit 
dissent is kept off-stage, but tacit dissent becomes a weapon of the weak. 
 
An expansive literature has studied electioneering in sub-Saharan Africa since the third wave of 
democratization. Numerous studies examine when and how African parties engaged in clientelist 
exchanges with citizens (Kramon 2017). Others examine when and how parties appeal to 
citizens’ ethnic identities (Cheeseman and Larmer 2015). Others still contend that parties win 
support by making valence appeals (Bleck and van de Walle 2018). A parallel literature studies 
which appeals voters are most receptive to (Lindberg 2013), and implicitly, which appeals are 
most effective. Others still study parties’ deployment of particular discourses such as populism 
(Cheeseman and Larmer 2015; Larmer and Fraser 2007) or nationalism (Beresford 2012). 
However, by concentrating on discourse and appeals, these studies focus on the content of the 
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messages that parties craft, rather than on the means by which they impart those messages (Paget 
2019a). Relatedly, studies attribute electoral success almost exclusively to the selection and 
delivery of particular messages (Beresford 2012; Cheeseman and Larmer 2015; Kramon 2017; 
Larmer and Fraser 2007) rather than, for example, disparities in their ground campaigns. 
 
In this respect, the recent Africanist literature differs markedly both from the comparative 
literature and from the preceding generation of Africanist studies. There is a fast-growing parallel 
literature about how mobile phones and social media are changing African media environments 
(Srinivasan and Diepeveen 2018; Srinivasan, Diepeveen, and Karekwaivanane 2018; Wasserman 
2011). However, there is little systematic treatment of the means and media through which 
African political parties convey their messages in the campaign. In particular, there is little 
consideration of the character or structure of the ground campaign. The treatment of ground 
campaigns is limited to descriptions of leaders’ rallies (Bleck and van de Walle 2018; Foucher 
2007; Larmer and Fraser 2007; Tendi 2013) and observations of the form that rallies have an 
‘entertainment component’ (Bob-Milliar 2014). Some recent studies examine ground campaigns 
in further depth. However, they focus primarily on targeting strategy (Brierley and Kramon 2018; 
Cheeseman, Lynch, and Willis 2017; Horowitz 2016; Rauschenbach 2017). I seek to restore the 
prominence and variety of the ground campaign to the study of electoral mobilization in sub-
Saharan Africa. I do so by locating many African elections, and others across the globe, in a truly 
comparative typology of campaign ecologies. 
 
The rally-intensive campaign 
 
The authors of the aforementioned typologies are clear that their schemas should be able to 
conceptually accommodate all election campaigns. Farrell and Webb state that ‘our threefold 
typological device is therefore essentially a heuristic device, a classificatory scheme of ideal-types’ 
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(Farrell and Webb 2000:106). Campaigns should only sit displaced from that continuum as real 
examples deviate from ideal-types. These ideal-types ‘should…be seen as a continuum along 
which organizations are moving - from a “premodern” pole to an “advanced-modern” pole’ 
(Farrell and Webb 2000:106). Similarly, Norris states that ‘contests can continue to be arrayed 
from the premodern to the postmodern’ (Norris 2000:140). Deviations of particular campaigns 
from the features of these types should be explained by reference to ‘mediating’, and therefore 
implicitly secondary, factors (Norris 2000:151). Therefore, these typologies build-in strong 
judgements about which sorts of variation in campaigns to privilege and which sorts to trivialize, 
which to treat as significant and which to treat as insignificant. Among other things, they 
trivialize the rally; for them, the incidence or absence of the rally is only pertinent to the 
categorization of ground campaigns as a constitutive part of the election campaign. In effect, 
ground campaigns are homogenized in these schemas. 
 
Even Plasser and Plasser treat ground campaigns as homogeneous. Like other authors in this 
canon, they invariably refer to rallies, canvassing and other aspects of the ground campaign 
together, as one bundle of associated campaign activities. Describing Indian campaigning, they 
write that ‘traditional campaign practices like mass rallies and canvassing drives prevail’ (Plasser 
& Plasser, 2002:279). In a telltale sign, they describe ground campaigns as ‘premodern’ (Plasser & 
Plasser, 2002:278). Therefore, at best, they treat heterogeneity in ground campaigns as 
insignificant. 
 
This is my point of departure from the comparative literature on election campaigning. In some 
ground campaigns, few people are reached directly at rallies. Rallies are employed by leaders to 
win and stylize media coverage (Cohen and Powell 2005; Jones 1998). However, in most 
contemporary Western countries, candidates present themselves at mass meetings to just a slither 
of their electorates (Dalton, McAllister, and Wattenberg 2000). For example, in the 2012 
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elections in the United States, just 5.6% of respondents attended ralliesiii, even though leaders’ 
rallies are frequently covered on mass media. This is not a sign of the decline of ground 
campaigning in general. On the contrary, the evidence suggests that Western ground campaigns 
are flourishing (Beck and Heidemann 2014). Nonetheless, rallies are marginal in these ground 
campaigns. In other ground campaigns, the rally is the primary means throughout which parties 
interact with voters directly. Therefore, in these campaigns, rallies form a significant part of 
parties’ perennial political communication goals: to multiply and target campaign contact 
(Epstein 2018: 7) for the ostensible purpose of persuading and mobilizing citizens (Nielsen 
2012). 
 
I define the rally as a public event at which speakers address an audience face-to-face for the 
ostensible purpose of politically mobilising it. Publicness distinguishes the rally from internal 
meetings. The format of speaker and audience distinguishes the rally from the other forms of 
campaign contact such as the canvass. It also suggests how to distinguish rallies from other mass 
political events such as marches and parades; insofar as they do not feature speakers addressing 
audiences, they are not rallies. The purpose of mobilisation distinguishes the rally from the 
lecture and the sermon. 
 
Nowhere is the preponderance of the rally greater than in sub-Saharan Africa. In the 30 sub-
Saharan countries surveyed in the Fifth Round of the Afrobarometer, the average country rate of 
rally attendance was 40.6%. In thirteen countries, it was 45% or greater. A breakdown of these 
results is presented in Figure 1. Despite the possibility that social desirability bias inflates these 
answers, this scale of rally attendance cannot be stressed enough. Across the countries surveyed, 
on average, more than three times as many people attended a rally at the last election as asked a 
government official for help in the last year. Equally, more than three times as many people 
attended a rally at the last election as took part in a demonstration or protest in the last year.iv By 
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overlooking the preponderance of rallies, the literature has under-appreciated an essential feature 
of the structure of many African campaigns. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
These towering rates of rally attendance are mirrored elsewhere. The Third Wave of the Asian 
Barometer shows that the proportion of people that attend a ‘rally or political party meeting’ 
reaches peaks of 42 per cent in Cambodia, 50 per cent in Thailand, 55 per cent in Mongolia and 
65 per cent in Vietnam.v While any portion of these figures may represent in-door or member-
only party meetings, rather than public rallies which are open to all, they nonetheless offer a 
strong initial indication of the scale of rally attendance. 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
Aggregate rates of rally attendance also varied across Western ‘premodern’ campaigns. British 
platform speaking only became commonplace after William Gladstone’s first Midlothian 
campaign in 1879 (Meisel 2001). Even then, it remained primarily the preserve of party leaders. 
Similarly, in the United States, ‘stumping’ was privileged in some campaigns and neglected in 
other ‘front-porch’ campaigns (Boller 1996). Changes in transportation, amplification and the 
franchise made campaigns in the Western world more rally-intensive from the 1920s to the 
1940s. For example, in 1879, Gladstone addressed an unprecedented 90,000 people over 30 
meetings (Meisel 2001). Fifty years later, Stanley Baldwin addressed an estimated 200,000 people 
at a single meeting (Lawrence 2009:107). Consequently, rallies became vital to campaigning. In 
the United States, Calvin Coolidge did not take to the stump in the 1924 campaign. However, 
every subsequent Republican and Democratic candidate did so vigorously until 1952 (Boller 
1996). 




During the interwar period, junior candidates convened more rallies too. Jon Lawrence suggests 
that there was a late ‘golden age’ of the rally at the constituency-level in Britain (Lawrence 2009). 
Paula Cossart describes the ascendance of the meeting-cum-demonstration in France (Cossart 
2013). Therefore, premodern campaigns varied in rally-intensiveness in the very countries which 
served as the evidential basis of existing typologies of election campaigns. 
 
Neither Norris’ three campaign types, nor Plasser and Plasser’s five campaign styles, adequately 
capture the profound differences between these ground campaigns. However, if creatively 
revised, Norris’ schema could. Incorporating this variation involves unbundling features of the 
campaign, and this in turn involves shedding the typology of its modernist features. This creates 
different conceptual challenges. Norris takes the degree of modernity as a defining feature of 
each campaign type. This modernity is embodied in eight different types of features which vary 
across each type of campaign (Norris 2000: 138-9). Without modernity as an organizing concept, 
one must reconsider which of these eight features, or what at all, defines a campaign type. This 
dilemma is only exacerbated by the growing body of evidence that the relationships between 
each of these campaign features are complex. Many of the close associations, for example, 
between campaign ecology and party organization, which may have seemed compelling when 
they were first advanced, have been challenged since. These old certainties have given way to 
studies that identify significant variation within the same types of campaigns (Plasser and Plasser 
2002; Vaccari 2013). Therefore, typologies that theoretically bundle numerous features together 
have become more difficult to defend as empirical generalizations. 
 
In recognition of these complications, I curtail some of the claims involved in this adapted 
typology, and taper others. I focus on the campaign ecology, defined as the channels, media and 
other means through which political messages travel. I take the campaign ecology as definitive of 
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the campaign. Farrell and Webb disparage these ‘mechanics’ as a reductive basis for a rounded 
characterization of a campaign (Farrell and Webb 2000:103). However, by elaborating this 
adapted typology, I do not feign to offer a rounded or a complete characterization of campaigns. 
Indeed, campaigns are too complex and multifaceted to be sufficiently characterized by a few, or 
perhaps even a host of features. Instead, I adopt the more modest goal of elaborating the key 
features of campaign ecology. I recategorize the other seven aspects of the campaign that Norris 
enumerates as typical features which are often, but not always, associated with campaign 
ecologies. Thereby, I seek to retain the reach of Norris’ terminology, while laying the conceptual 
ground work that will enable the interrogation of the links between campaign ecologies and 
those other features. 
 
This reworking of Norris’ schema involves distinguishing between campaign ecologies on two 
dimensions. The first is the proportion of campaign contact which is made indirectly through 
mass media, or as Jesper Strömbäck describes it, the first aspect of campaign ‘mediatization’ 
(Strömbäck 2008). The second is the degree to which media channels proliferate, media becomes 
participatory, and media fuse, or what one might describe, borrowing from Andrew Chadwick, 
as media hybridity (Chadwick 2013). As this adaptation relieves the typology of its modernist 
underpinnings, I have taken the liberty of suggesting different names for the associated campaign 
ecologies. These new names shear the campaigns of their modernist terminology, but remain 
true to the essence of Norris’ ideal-types in other respects: the ground-intensive campaign 
ecology (premodern), the mass media-intensive campaign ecology (modern), and, borrowing 
from Andrew Chadwick, the hybrid campaign ecology (postmodern). These campaign ecologies 
are home to corresponding campaign types: ground-intensive campaigns, mass media-intensive 
campaigns and hybrid campaigns. In the interests of good prose, I refer to these ecologies and 
corresponding campaign types interchangeably hereafter. This is set out in the first part of Figure 
3. 




To express the differences in electioneering which I have described, I propose distinguishing 
between campaign ecologies on a third dimension: the rally-intensiveness of the ground 
campaign. Hereby defined, the higher aggregate rally attendance climbs, the more rally-intensive 
the ground campaign becomes. The ground campaign is a component of every election 
campaign, and so ‘rally-intensiveness’ is a dimension along which campaign ecologies can be 
placed. This criterion captures campaigns such as those described above, where rallies are a 
means to directly reach large numbers of people. However, it excludes campaigns in which 
leaders convene rallies to win or shape media coverage, but do not reach many people directly. 
This new dimension creates the conceptual space to plot a distinct ideal-type: the rally-intensive 
campaign ecology. Rally-intensive campaigns are those in which the ground campaign is rally-
intensive and the campaign as a whole is ground campaign-intensive. This third dimension and 
fourth ideal-type are illustrated in the second part of Figure 3 below. Neither this category, nor 
this typology, is Africa-specific. Rally-intensive campaigns can be found across the globe. 
However, it is likely that most contemporary rally-intensive campaigns are in sub-Saharan Africa, 
and that the most emblematic examples are African. 
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
At first sight, rally-intensiveness may not appear to be an aspect of campaign ecology. Unlike 
television penetration or channel proliferation, rally-intensiveness is not a ‘hard’, technological 
factor. However, as many have argued, technologies themselves are social (Chadwick 2013). 
Campaign mediatization, for example, depends in part on changing habits of media use for news 
and leisure (Herbert 2004). Equally, it depends upon the construction of ‘the news’, media 
authority and media trustworthiness. This is why the term ‘campaign ecology’ characterizes the 
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aspect of the campaign in question better than ‘campaign environment’. It involves patterned 
interactions between actors, the very essence of an ecology. 
 
Rally-intensive campaigning in Tanzania 
 
One might distinguish between campaigns across endless possible dimensions. If typologies of 
campaigns are to recognize aggregate rally attendance as a significant dimension of campaign 
ecology, aggregate rally attendance should be consequential. In this section, I enumerate four 
features that stem from the rally-intensiveness of a campaign, features that typify, but are not 
definitive of, rally-intensive campaigns. I do so by examining electioneering in Tanzania. 
Tanzania has the best-attended election campaign rallies in sub-Saharan Africa, and to the best of 
my knowledge, the world. Table 1 shows that in 2010, 74% of Tanzanians attended campaign 
rallies, a higher rate than anywhere else on the continent. Original survey data presented below 
shows that 69% of all Tanzanians attended rallies in the last month of the election campaign in 
2015 alone.vi Nationwide, that amounts to 15.76 million of the country’s 22.75 million registered 
voters.vii This giddy proportion is only marginally smaller than the 77% of respondents that 
report regularly receiving radio news, and much less than the proportion that receive regular 
news from any other mass medium.viii 
 
I select the Tanzanian case because of its extremity, to borrow Bent Flyvberg’s term (Flyvbjerg 
2006). The accentuated rally-intensiveness of Tanzania’s campaigns makes its characteristics 
particularly pronounced. By studying them, I can distil four features of the rally-intensive 
campaign. This creates issues of external validity which this case study cannot resolve altogether. 
While there are signs that these four features can be found in other rally-intensive campaigns, I 
cannot verify how well this theory travels. How well it does, and how intervening variables 
mediate its travel, should be the subject of further research. 




First, unlike ground-intensive campaigns as defined above, in rally-intensive campaigns local 
candidates convene rallies as frequently as national candidates do. Second, unlike ground-
intensive campaigns, local rallies are better attended in aggregate than national ones. A 
consequence thereof is that the most common form of campaign contact between mid- and low-
level politicians and voters is direct, although not always participatory. Third, unlike in ground-
intensive campaigns, the canvass pales in comparison to the rally as a means of campaign 
contact. Fourth, and relatedly, local campaigners do not direct most of their efforts to 
canvassing. Instead, they dedicate a large portion of their efforts to ‘producing’ rallies. 
 
To explore and describe ground campaigning ethnographically (Hammersley and Atkinson 
2007), I conducted eight months of field research in Tanzania, which incorporated the 2015 
general election campaign. I focused on the campaigns of parliamentary candidates in eight 
constituencies. There, I conducted 148 unstructured interviews with candidates, mid-level 
officials, and low-level activists. I examined campaigning in these constituencies first-hand; I was 
a latent participant observer at 42 rallies altogether (Spradley 1980). I complement this with data 
from a representative post-election survey with 1,000 respondents. These methods are described 
further in the supplementary information file. 
 
First, in Tanzania, candidates of all levels of juniority and seniority dedicate enormous efforts to 
holding rallies. The two candidates that came first and second in Tanzania’s 2015 election, John 
Pombe Magufuli and Edward Ngoyai Lowassa, held on average 3.3 and 3.6 meetings per day 
during the last month of their campaigns respectively.ix Other party leaders were dispatched to 
convene parallel sets of rallies. However, rallies are not primarily the preserve of party leaders, as 
they are in other sorts of campaigns. Rival slates of parliamentary candidates toured their 
constituencies without pause throughout the two-month official campaign. Typically, a candidate 
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would hold perhaps three meetings each day, but some, with the aid of helicopters and advance 
teams, addressed as many as seven meetings on some days. Many candidates planned to visit 
each village in their constituency two or three times during the campaign. Below parliamentary 
candidates, ward councilor candidates held their own meetings, riding on parliamentary coat-tails 
when possible, but conducting most of their rallies independently. Altogether, candidates at each 
level of seniority dedicate the lion’s share of their time during election campaigns to holding 
meeting after meeting. As a consequence, thousands of candidates address meetings during each 
day of election campaigns in Tanzania. 
 
Second, more people attend local rallies than national ones. In the survey described above, 
respondents were asked which parties’ rallies they had attended in the last month of the 
campaign, if any. They were asked whether the most senior politicians that spoke at these 
meetings were (1) presidential candidates, (2) national politicians, (3) parliamentary candidates, 
(4) councilor candidates, or (5) other local leaders. Finally, they were asked how many of each 
they had attended. No other survey has asked questions which disaggregate patterns of rally 
attendance in such detail, to the best of my knowledge. These results are reported in Table 1 
below, summarized across the ruling party, Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM), the leading opposition 
party, Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (Chadema), and all parties combined. The first two 
categories are folded together into ‘national campaign rallies’ and the final three categories are 
folded into ‘local rallies’. The results show that national campaign rallies were not the best 
attended body of campaign rallies; instead, local rallies were. While a weighted 39% of 
respondents reported attending CCM’s national rallies, 58% reported attending its local rallies. 
Similarly, almost 33% of respondents reported attending Chadema’s national rallies, while 35% 
reported attending its local ones. Therefore, while national rallies are typically the largest 
individually, mid- and low-tier candidates address more voters in aggregate 
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[Table 1 about here] 
 
This reveals something about the directness of party-voter communication in Tanzania. In the 
2015 election, 68.2% of citizens saw a parliamentary candidate, councilor candidate or other local 
party leader speak. 48.8% saw a presidential candidate or other national leader speak. 
Furthermore, these contacts were frequent. Aggregating the number of reported rally 
attendances, the average respondent reported attending to 3.4 CCM local rallies and 1.6 
Chadema local ones. Equally, they reported attending an average of 1.1 CCM national rallies and 
0.6 Chadema national rallies. These attendance rates may be inflated by social desirability bias. 
Nonetheless, one can conclude with confidence that the majority of Tanzanians saw at least one 
prospective elected representative with the naked eye during an election campaign. Furthermore, 
while national rallies are attended by tens or hundreds of thousands of people, local rallies are 
normally attended by a few hundred. Therefore, during the campaign, a majority of Tanzanians 
see their local candidates just meters away from them. This does not necessarily make politics 
more participatory. At the rallies that I observed, candidates took few questions. Parties managed 
dissent, and controlled whose voices were privileged. Audience participation was often confined 
to cheering, booing, singing, applauding and displaying party paraphernalia. Excitement was 
displayed through running and dancing.x Hostility was displayed through violence. Much like in 
the barazas of one-party Kenya, dissent was kept off-stage (Haugerud 1995). Attendees bent on 
displaying their approval or disapproval audaciously wrote messages on banners or brought 
home-made symbolic objects into the crowd. At one rally, attendees brought a mock coffin 
bearing a candidate’s name.xi Nonetheless, the common proximity of voters and candidates 
distinguishes the aesthetic and content of citizen-politician interaction in rally-intensive 
campaigns from other types of campaign. 
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Third, Table 1 demonstrates that not only was the rate of rally attendance in Tanzania high; it far 
surpassed the canvassing rate. As I have written elsewhere (Paget 2019b), the aggregate 
canvassing rate is high by international standards. 20% of respondents reported being spoken to 
face-to-face in the month before the election, comparable to high rates of canvassing in sub-
Saharan Africa, and indeed internationally (Brierley and Kramon 2018; Norris 2000). However, 
nyumba-kwa-nyumba or ‘house-to-house’ contact pales in comparison to the frequency with which 
voters and parties interact through the medium of the rally. In other words, Table 1 shows that 
in rally-intensive campaigns, rallies dwarf the canvass as a means of campaign contact in 
Tanzania. 
 
Fourth, local campaign effort is directed primarily to producing rallies, rather than primarily to 
canvassing. Producing rallies is partly about mobilizing people to attend them. Despite the scale 
of aggregate rally attendance in Tanzania, parties cannot assume that people will come to their 
meetings. On the contrary, one Chadema interviewee complained that in their district, ‘not many 
people come to the public rallies’.xii Party branches draw people to their rallies by notifying them 
when and where rallies will take place. A CCM ward official told me that ‘we use branch 
chairmen of respective places to inform members that we shall be having a meeting’.xiii Often, it 
is CCM mabalozi otherwise known as ‘ambassadors’ or ‘ten-cell leaders’, or Chadema msingi or 
‘foundations’ that mobilize in this way. One participant of a CCM focus group explained that ‘It 
is the branch secretary who asks ten-cell leaders to inform the electorate; the ten-cell leaders will 
go because they know their neighborhood leaders.’xiv 
 
In Tanzania, party branches and local campaign networks not only mobilize people to attend the 
meeting, but staff it as well. A Chadema official explained that ‘the meeting is opened by the 
branch leader’.xv They physically prepare the grounds for the rally, raising flags, hanging bunting, 
arranging chairs, and building stages. They bring sufficient supporters to form a nucleus crowd 
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that entices others to join. Members of parties’ paramilitary wings police rallies and manage 
disturbance and dissent. Equally, they lay on music and dance that lend meetings a festive 
atmosphere. These entertainers range from praise singers, to poets, hip hop artists, dancers and 
choirs, but women’s choirs or dancing groups called ngoma are the most typical. Entertainment at 
such meetings fills most of the time at the beginning and end of a rally.xvi 
 
These performances make rallies festive, not least because a stereo with such power and bass is a 
rare pleasure which is visibly enjoyed in Tanzanian villages.xvii Politicians’ speeches are often 
short, and the jubilant atmosphere that party activists work to create draws crowds. Activists 
enact social rituals which accord the politicians attending meetings status and prestige. For 
example, politicians are often greeted at meetings with great fanfare. They are rushed by 
adulating supporters.xviii They are met by welcome committees.xix Their arrival is accompanied by 
the singing of choirs.xx They are often escorted into the village or neighborhood by a procession 
or honor guard.xxi Once assembled, they are flattered by praise singers,xxii prayed for,xxiii vouched 
for by local and national dignitaries,xxiv and given symbolic presents as performative 
endorsements.xxv All of these tasks are crucial for the successful production and execution of the 
rally and they all demand the effort of the ‘campaign assemblage’ (Nielsen 2012). Accordingly, 





Typologies of election campaigns play critical roles in the study of electoral politics. They 
periodize histories of electioneering. They bring order to differences in election campaigns in the 
present. Further still, they delimit the scope of enquiry. Comparative analyses of electioneering in 
the ‘digital age’ or the ‘postmodern campaign’, for example, either make explicit reference to the 
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typologies discussed in this article, or use equivalent terms and categories to define their domains 
of application. In this article, I have argued that existing typologies neglect a vital aspect of 
election campaigns: their rally-intensiveness. I have proposed a revised typology to incorporate 
the rally-intensive campaign into a set of campaign ecologies. 
 
This distinction gives expression to some of the differences between election campaigns in the 
contemporary Western world and the Global South. It creates the conceptual framework to 
articulate both similarities and differences between campaigns in parts of sub-Sahara Africa, 
Latin America and Asia. Indeed, evidence suggests that many rally-intensive election campaigns 
can be found beyond sub-Saharan Africa. Inter-regional differences aside, this framework 
elucidates a dimension of variation between African election campaigns. Equally, it throws into 
relief historical changes in electioneering in the Western world. Therefore, the implications of 
this article are rather grand. I have adapted Norris’ typology of election campaigns to 
internationalize its reach, but equally, I have complicated past classifications of historic election 
campaigns in the Western world. 
 
Electioneering in Tanzania illustrates why the rally-intensive campaigns merit recognition as a 
distinct type of campaign ecology which differs from others, and in particular, differs from 
ground-intensive (premodern) campaign ecologies. In rally-intensive campaigns, such is the scale 
of aggregate rally attendance that canvassing constitutes only a minority of direct campaign 
contact. In rally-intensive campaigns, not only party leaders address meetings; candidates at every 
level of the party do. Furthermore, in aggregate, more people attend local rallies than national 
ones. Accordingly, a large portion of party-voter interaction in rally-intensive campaigns is direct, 
although it may not be as participatory as in the ground-intensive or ‘premodern’ campaign. In 
rally-intensive campaigns, local effort is directed differently. Local campaign networks are tasked 
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not only with canvassing. They direct enormous efforts to a variety of activities described here as 
the ‘production of rallies.’ 
 
This article is also revealing about changes in the structure of campaign communication in 
Tanzania. In 1989, in the twilight years of the postcolonial era, Ellis identified ‘pavement radio’, 
or chains of inter-personal discussion, as the primary means by which current affairs was 
‘broadcast’ in sub-Saharan Africa (Ellis 1989). Thirty years on, those oral cultures of news and 
discussion persist, not least in Tanzania. However, they live alongside oral cultures of mass 
meetings which have taken on varied forms in multiparty regimes. The prominence of the mass 
rally is a crucial component of the altered structure of electioneering across much of the 
continent and, thus, deserves to be understood and studied in its own right.  
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Figure 2: National rates of rally and party meeting attendance in Asia 
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Figure 3: A reworked schema of election campaign ecologies 
 
  





Table 1: Disaggregated campaign contactxxviii 




CCM Canvassing 9.9% 1.0% 0.252 0.029 
National 
campaign rallies 
39.1% 1.8% 1.053 0.065 
Local rallies 57.8% 2.0% 3.370 0.160 
Chadema Canvassing 11.8% 1.2% 0.281 0.030 
 National 
campaign rallies 
32.7% 2.3% 0.618 0.051 
 Local rallies 35.0% 1.7% 1.639 0.097 
All Canvassing 20.0% 1.4% 0.565 0.048 
National 
campaign rallies 
48.8% 1.85% 1.826 0.095 
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